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Case Notes
Administrative Law and Procedure-Criminal Law-Exclusionary Rule-
Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 25 App. Div. 2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433
(1966).
IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE his restaurant-liquor establishment, licensee Frank Leogrande,
Jr. was observed by a police officer being approached by four unknown persons who
engaged the licensee in conversation as well as handing him money. The police officer
also overheard one of the men ask the licensee to "Give me five for a dollar." On the
basis of what he had observed and overheard, the officer obtained and returned
with a search warrant. The warrant was executed and a search revealed incriminating
evidence indicating that the licensee was engaging in professional gambling activi-
ties. Criminal action was instituted, but the evidence was ruled inadmissible after
the search warrant was controverted. The criminal charges were thereupon dis-
missed.
About four and one-half months later, a second search warrant was issued, based
upon another police officer's observations of one McHugh being approached by sev-
eral persons and engaging him in conversation, handing him money, and resulting
in certain notations on paper. For two consecutive days this was observed and in each
case the police officer also saw that McHugh passed the papers and money to the li-
censee who was sitting outside the licensed premises in a parked automobile. The
second search warrant was also executed and again revealed incriminating evidence
relating to gambling activities on the part of the licensee. However, the subsequent
criminal proceeding was dismissed against Leogrande after the search warrant was
controverted and vacated for lack of probable cause.
Even though all criminal charges against Leogrande were dismissed, the New York
State Liquor Authority subsequently determined in administrative proceedings that
the evidence indicating that Leogrande had engaged in gambling activities was com-
petent and sufficiently ample to warrant cancellation of his restaurant-liquor license.
Leogrande petitioned the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, to review the revoca-
tion,1 contending that the evidence used to revoke his license was not competent be-
cause it was the product of an illegal search and seizure by police officers. Petitioner
argued that the testimony presented by the two police officers in the Authority's ad-
ministrative proceeding should be ruled incompetent because it resulted from search
warrants subsequently vacated for lack of probable cause, and that the evidence, oth-
er than that tainted by illegality, was not sufficient to sustain the cancellation. In a
decision by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, held, evidence
1C.P.L.R. § 7801.
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secured in an illegal search and seizure by public officials is incompetent and should
be barred in the administrative proceeding conducted by the State Liquor Authority
or any other official proceeding brought to impose forfeitures, penalties, or similar
sanctions for violations of regulation or law. 2 Accordingly, the court annulled the
cancellation and ordered restoration of the license.
The novel issue in this case-whether the exclusionary rule involving illegally ob-
tained evidence normally applied in criminal proceedings extends to an administra-
tive or civil proceeding brought by public officials-is not one that has been precisely
passed upon by the Court of Appeals and rarely by courts of other jurisdictions.
Most administrative law and regulation is based on some form of sanction, and with
a holding that search and seizure prohibitions, normally only applicable to criminal
proceedings, extend to administrative proceedings resting on such sanctions, the de-
cision has broad implications. Noted in the decision, but deemed irrelevant and not
passed upon, was the question of the extension of the exclusionary rule to such ad-
ministrative processes as subsequent and independent applications for licenses, posi-
tions in the public service, and other administrative proceedings which might involve
penalties, forfeitures, or other sanctions. 4 However, the decision was consistent with
the thrust of previous cases handed down by the Court of Appeals and the United
States Supreme Court, and it constitutes a befitting recognition of individual rights
in a judicial era which seems to emphasize their importance.
While the exclusionary rule is well-recognized in both federal and state jurisdic-
tions,5 there was some question, at least in New York until the instant case, whether
it could be extended to administrative or civil proceedings brought by public officials
where evidence unlawfully obtained by public officials is introduced. That there was
some question can be traced to Frank v. Maryland,6 probably the leading case on ad-
ministrative search. There a health inspector of the City of Baltimore was seeking
the source of rat infestation at the rear of the appellant's home, discovered evidence
of such infestation, and, without a search warrant, asked for and was refused permis-
sion to inspect his basement at a reasonable hour of the day. The health inspector
was acting under a city ordinance providing that he may demand entry to any house,
cellar, or enclosure if the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay entry, in order to
determine whether a nuisance had been created.7 Appellant Frank refused and was
subsequently convicted of a misdemeanor involving a small fine. In appealing, it was
Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 25 App. Div. 2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1966).
See also Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1959); District of Columbia v. Little,
178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
'Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, supra note 2, at 231, 232, 268 N.Y.S. 2d at 440.
5 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948); People v. Rainey, 14 N.Y. 2d 35, 197 N.E. 2d 527, 248 N.Y.S. 2d 33 (1964); People
v. Fine, 14 N.Y. 2d 160, 199 N.E. 2d 151, 250 N.Y.S. 2d 47 (1964). Of course protection against
search and seizure was considered for a long time in New York as not constitutionally de-
rived but as a creature of statute. In 1938, when the statutory restraint against unreasonable
searches and seizures was incorporated into the state constitution, proposals to adopt the
exclusionary rule failed. Thus, it was not until Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that the
exclusionary rule was applied in New York. See Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 25
App. Div. 225, 232, 268 N.Y.S. 2d 433, 441 (1966) (Eager, J., dissenting).
6 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
7 BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 12, § 120 (1950). Cited at 359 U.S. 360, 361 (1959).
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contended that his conviction resulted from resisting an inspection of his house
which was without a warrant and was obtained in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. By a sharply divided court, the United States Supreme Court held that the
municipal ordinance permitting the demand for entry was valid and that the convic-
tion for resisting inspection without a warrant was not in violation of the due pro-
cess clause.8 The attempted inspection was viewed by the court as pursued solely for
the protection of the community's health, not as one where evidence for a criminal
prosecution was sought, and to this the constitutional protection against official in-
trusion was held not to extend.9 Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
argued that, "inspection without a warrant, as an adjunct to a regulatory scheme for
the general welfare of the community and not as a means of enforcing the criminal
law, has antecedents deep in our history."10
In distinguishing between what then can be described as an administrative inspec-
tion which is an adjunct to a regulatory scheme and a search basically designed to
uncover criminal evidence, Mr. Justice Frankfurter set forth the doctrine that two
protections arise from the broad constitutional prohibition against public intrusions.
The first of these, the right of privacy, is available unless entry on the part of public
officials is "under proper authority of law."' 1 The second protection is the right to re-
sist unauthorized entry when it has as its purpose the securing of information which
might be used against the individual at a later juncture. Under the second protec-
tion, evidence of criminal action cannot be seized ordinarily without a judicially is-
sued search warrant. But inasmuch as the inspection in Frank was not designed to
seek out evidence of criminal action, the second protection was not applicable.
Moreover, regarding the first and intimately related protection, it could not be in-
voked and applied. The attempted "inspection" was merely to determine whether a
health nuisance, rat infestation, existed. The maintenance of minimum community
standards of health and welfare was sought, not evidence for a criminal prosecution.
On this basis, Frank's refusal to permit the health inspector to enter his home can be
based not on a right to resist unauthorized entry, having as its purpose the securing
of information to be used against him at a later time, but upon a right to be secure
from official invasion of one's privacy where that entry is not under proper authority
of law.12 But here there was no right to refuse entry, since it was an inspection de-
signed for the protection of the community's health which was under proper author-
ity of law.18
Frank, of course, is potentially applicable to Leogrande if the search be deemed to
be administrative and as an adjunct to a regulatory scheme for the general welfare,
8 Frank v. Maryland, supra note 6, at 362.
9Id. at 366.
10Id. at 367. But see the sharp dissent in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959), where
Mr. Justice Douglas takes issue with this view.
n Id. at 365.
2Id. at 365.
8 Id. at 367-73, where Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, reviews the history
of the exercise of similar powers of inspection and concludes that when an inspection is
undertaken for legitimate community purposes, e.g., health and safety, it is under proper
authority of law and not violative of a right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment.
[Vol. XVI
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and not as one where the evidence is to be used to form the basis of a criminal prose-
cution. If that be the case, the evidence which was ruled inadmissible and excluded
in criminal proceedings against the petitioner can be used by the Liquor Authority
to revoke his license. Both are civil cases-Frank, a health inspection aimed at uncov-
ering the source of rodent infestation, and Leogrande, a proceeding conducted by the
Liquor Authority to consider whether a license should be revoked. Furthermore, nei-
ther case directly involved criminal prosecution leading to criminal penalties. How-
ever, when a court determines that an administrative or civil search is directed to-
ward such prosecution or penalties, a result different from Frank is required.
Such a result was reached in People v. Laverne,14 a recent New York case also con-
cerned with administrative search. There reliance was placed by the prosecution on
Frank v. Maryland.15 Laverne involved a prosecution for violation of a municipal
ordinance16 prohibiting the operation of a business in a nonbusiness zone. Building
inspectors, acting under authority of the ordinance, entered the premises and made
observations which formed the basis of subsequent criminal charges against the ap-
pellant. Thus a clear question was presented: whether a civil ordinance authorized
an administrative official to enter upon private premises without the owner's consent
and obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution. The Court of Appeals said no.
Laverne admitted that under Frank, an entry into private premises by a public
official entering without a search warrant against the resistance of the occupant and
in pursuance of the authority of law for the purposes of eliminating a hazard imme-
diately dangerous to public health and welfare is probably ". .. constitutionally valid
if the purpose be summary or other administrative correction, or as a foundation for
civil judicial proceedings."' 7 But as with Leogrande, Laverne was not concerned with
administrative inspection leading to administrative correction within the purview of
Frank, but an official search of private premises without a warrant which led to a
subsequent criminal prosecution.' 8 For a long time prior to the unauthorized entry
by the building inspector in Laverne, a controversy had existed between the munici-
pality and the defendant with respect to the right to conduct his business in an area
normally excluding business uses. An injunction against the appellant's corporation
had been obtained on a date considerably prior to the time when the searches were
conducted, so there was strong evidence in the record indicating that the building
inspector had not entered to determine whether the ordinance was being violated in
order to facilitate administrative correction.19 Under these conditions, the Court of
Appeals felt compelled to declare that to the extent that the searches were for the
purposes of criminal prosecution, they were in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights. 20 This enabled the Court of Appeals to point out that it was not passing on
14 People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y. 2d 304, 200 N.E. 2d 441, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 452 (1964).
15 Frank v. Maryland, supra note 6.
le LAUREL HOLLOw, N.Y., BUILDING ZONE ORDINANCE art. X. §§ 5.0, 10.2.
17 People v. Laverne, supra note 14, at 305, 200 N.E. 2d at 442, 251 N.Y.S. 2d at 454.
Is Id. at 308, 200 N.E. 2d at 443, 251 N.Y.S. 2d at 455.
1Id. at 306, 200 N.E. 2d at 442, 251 N.Y.S. 2d at 453.
2DId. at 308, 200 N.E. 2d at 443, 251 N.Y.S. 2d at 455.
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the validity of a search utilized for a civil action, but rather one utilized for a crimi-
nal prosecution. 2'
While the Court of Appeals had refused to pass on the question of the validity of a
search utilized for administrative or civil action, the result reached in that case en-
couraged the result reached in Leogrande by refusing to uphold an administrative
or civil search and excluding evidence obtained in such a search when an individual
would be facing criminal proceedings and the usual penalties involved as a result.
In Leogrande, the State Liquor Authority simply intended to use evidence previously
suppressed in a criminal proceeding in an administrative action which had as its pur-
pose the regulation of the liquor industry. But while the Authority's proceeding in
Leogrande was not criminal in nature, the evidence used was seized in an unlawful
criminal search and had official consequences which were considered by the court to
be at least as harsh as the criminal sanctions for gambling.2 2 Leading to the Leogrande
decision, this reasoning appears to be a logical extension of the Laverne case and is
also supported by a recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court.
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,23 a recent Supreme
Court case that supports Leogrande, also serves to illustrate the policy behind the
search and seizure prohibition as it should be applied to an administrative search.
Law enforcement officers of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board stationed in an-
other state observed a 1958 Plymouth Sedan bearing Pennsylvania registration plates
proceeding toward a city in Pennsylvania. Noting that the car was "low in the rear," 24
they followed it into Pennsylvania, and without a warrant, stopped and searched the
automobile and subsequently found thirty-one cases of liquor therein. The car and
liquor were then seized and the driver was arrested and charged with violation of il-
legal transportation of liquor as prohibited by state law. 25 As provided by statute,
the state filed a petition for forfeiture of the automobile.26 After the forfeiture had
been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,27 certiorari was granted by the
United States Supreme Court 28 to consider whether the search was lawful and wheth-
er the exclusionary rule29 applied to forfeiture proceedings of the character there in-
volved. In an opinion by Justice Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that even though
a criminal proceeding was not directly involved, evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment may not be relied upon to sustain a forfeiture.3 O
The court noted that the State Supreme Court had affirmed under the understand-
ing that the search and seizure prohibition applied only to criminal prosecutions
mIbid.
2 Supra note 4.
380 U.S. 693 (1965).
21Id. at 694.
OPURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-494(a) (1964 Cum. Supp.). Cited at 380 U.S. 693,
701 n. 9 (1965).
2 PUaDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-601 (1964 Cum. Supp.). Cited at 380 U.S. 693, 694
n. 2 (1965).
"Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 201 A. 2d 427 (1964), rev'd,
380 U.S. 693 (1965).
379 U.S. 927 (1964).
2Under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
81 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, supra note 23, at 696.
[Vol. XVI
Case Notes
and was not applicable to forfeiture proceedings which the state court deemed civil
in nature.3 1 Holding to the contrary, that is, that forfeiture proceedings were not ex-
actly civil in nature, led the court to find that the search and seizure prohibition was
operative, and as a result, evidence obtained in a search without a warrant or lacking
probable cause required that that evidence should be excluded.3 2 One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan, as with Leogrande, reverts then to the question whether a distinction can be
made between an ordinary criminal proceeding and a civil or administrative pro-
ceeding involving penalties, forfeitures, or other sanctions for the violation of law or
regulation. In either case, the distinction was not recognized.
Both cases placed strong reliance on Boyd v. United States, 33 the landmark Su-
preme Court case which refused to accept the classification of civil as opposed to
criminal in characterizing proceedings involving penalties for the purposes of apply-
ing the fourth amendment. While civil or administrative action involving forfeiture
does not constitute a criminal proceeding per se, they were characterized in the Boyd
decision as being quasi-criminal in nature in which the protection of the fourth
amendment must be made available. As pointed out in Boyd,
If the government prosecutor elects to waive an indictment, and to file a civil in-
formation against the claimants-i.e., civil in form-can he by this device take
from the proceeding its criminal aspect and deprive the claimants of their im-
munities as citizens ... this cannot be. The information, though technically a civ-
il proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one ... as therefore, suits for
penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law
are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of
criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the fourth amendment of the consti-
tution .... 34
Without arguing that the fourth amendment historically was designed to pro-
scribe all searches of private property without judicial warrants,35 and that evidence
obtained as a result should be excluded, regardless of whether the product of the
search was utilized for a criminal prosecution or a civil remedy, the holding in Boyd
alone seems to support the holding in Leogrande.
The holding was by an inferior state court and appears to be a limited one, and
would not appear to apply to all administrative proceedings or civil actions where
such proceedings are instituted by public officials and where evidence illegally ob-
tained by public officials is tendered. Leogrande observed that the exception of the
Frank ruling had understandable basis in guarding against health nuisances or dan-
gers to the common good.3 6 But in proceedings of the nature encompassed by the in-
stant case, the applicability of the search and seizure prohibition and the exclusion-
ary rule was well-warranted. The court declared that,
1a Commonwealth, supra note 27, at 542, 201 A. 2d at 429.
12 Id. at 702.
83 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
" Id. at 634.
See, e.g., the discussion by Prettyman, J., in District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
81 25 App. Div. 2d at 232, 268 N.Y.S. 2d at 440.
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... illegal activity of the police officers ... has official consequences more grave in
economic terms than those of the criminal sanctions for gambling. The licensee
... is subject to the loss of his valuable liquor license and to forfeiture of the 'pe-
nal sum' of $1,000 on the bond supplied to the administrative agency in connec-
tion with this license. The exclusionary rule rests on the theory of deterrence;
that policy would not be served if the illegal official activity could be used, de-
spite unavailability in criminal proceedings, to effect parallel sanctions of forfei-
ture in an administrative proceeding. 7
The holding that when a civil suit instituted by public officials and involving offi-
cial penalties is presented, search and seizure protection applies, is not without its
problems, because every ordinance, regulation, statute, or law must ultimately de-
pend upon some form of official penalty or sanction.38 In addition, whether there is
a real penalty involved is not always apparent and by no means clear in every case.
However, in such decisions as the Leogrande decision and the others reviewed above,
the courts have resolved these problems by examining the purpose of the search, the
circumstances underlying the search, the penalties and consequences they lead to,
and other relevant questions. On this basis, the result reached in Leogrande appears
to be a fair and reasonable approach to the problems posed as well as being support-
ed by previous cases of the Court of Appeals of New York and the United States Su-
preme Court.
eIbid.
8 But see Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting), where re-
quiring a warrant and "the test of 'probable cause'" seems to be advocated for all ordinary
searches, a proposal which would appear to eliminate at least one phase of the problem in
this respect.
Administrative Law-Procedure-Witness Fees-United States v. Lemlich,
Civil No. 65-850, S.D .Fla., Jan. 11, 1966.
A SUMMONS WAS IssuED by the Internal Revenue Service' to respondent, a corpo-
rate official, compelling his appearance to testify in an examination concerning the
withholding tax liability of his corporation. 2 IRS filed a petition pursuant to section
I United States v. Lemlich, Civil No. 65-850 Civ., S.D. Fla., Jan. 11, 1966; see also, United
States v. Wolff, docket number unavailable, S. D. Fla., Feb. 10, 1966.
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602.
§ 7602. Examination of books and witnesses.
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where
none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in
[Vol. XVI
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7604 (b) of the IRS Code3 before a federal district court in the 5th circuit to enforce
the summons, and for an order to show cause why the respondent should not be com-
pelled to obey the summons. The court issued an order for the respondent to appear
and declared that the summons was not invalid as a violation of the fourth amend-
ment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. However, the court held
that the summons was for an examination which was "a hearing" within the meaning
of section 95 (a), 4 the general authorization for payment of fees and expenses of wit-
nesses subpoenaed to appear at federal agency hearings; and the respondent, if com-
pelled to attend the examination, would be entitled to compensation upon appear-
ance.
Although it has not always been so, compensating witnesses is now a recognized
procedure in federal and state courts.5 The common law concept of duty to the com-
munity prevailed despite hardship to an uncompensated witness. According to this
doctrine, every person owes the state the duty of testifying to the extent of his knowl-
edge when summoned before a court.6 In Blair v. United States the Supreme Court
held that the compulsion of witnesses was at the very foundation of our judicial sys-
tem. "The personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary contribution of the
individual to the welfare of the public."7
The Court recognized that the act of 1853 provided for mileage and attendance
fees.8 But, in the absence of express statute, the Court held that the common law doc-
trine applies subject to rare exceptions, such as self-incrimination. 9 Relaxation of this
respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his
delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or
or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of
books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax
or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may
deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named
in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give
such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant
or material to such inquiry.
8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7604 (b) granting federal district courts authority to compel
attendance by appropriate process.
'60 Stat. 809 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 95 (a) (1964).
§ 95 (a). Same; government officers and employees attending department hearings.
Whenever a department is authorized by law to hold hearings and to subpoena wit-
nesses for appearance at said hearings, witnesses summoned to and attending such
hearings shall be entitled to the same fees and mileage, or expenses in the case of Gov-
ernment officers and employees, as provided by law for witnesses attending in the United
States Courts.
5 NLRB v. Gunaca, 135 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Wisc. 1955).
o Healy v. Hillsboro County, 70 N.H. 588, 49 Atl. 89 (1901); 8 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2175,
2192, 2193 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
8 REV. STAT. §§ 848, 855 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1825, 1871 (1964).
9 Blair v. United States, supra note 7; United Development Corporation v. State Highway
Dept., 133 N.W. 2d 439 (N.D. 1965).
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rule was held to abrogate the basic need of compulsion of witnesses. This compulsion
to testify was held analogous to the duty of a taxpayer to support the Government.
However, with the growth of litigation and the corresponding hardships on wit-
nesses, the need to provide for fees and expenses became apparent. While the courts
did not act, the legislature did. By statute, witnesses in either federal or state courts
are now entitled to mileage and fees;' 0 but the legislature intended to reimburse the
witness for expenses incurred and not to compensate the witness for his testimony."
The law now requires that the party who calls the witness must pay the fee.12 The
witness is entitled to this fee even if he does not appear.' 3 Included in calculating
the reimbursable expenses are the mileage and fees authorized for the respondent.14
The witness's right to compensation has not grown without certain limitations. A
witness who is a party to a suit or has a material interest in the outcome cannot claim
compensation for voluntary testimony on his behalf.'s However, compensation is al-
lowed for a witness with only an incidental interest in a suit such as a witness subject
to a combined suit in which he develops material interest, employees of interested
parties and stockholders, employees and officers of corporations.16
Other collateral rights for witnesses have developed from the unqualified common
law compulsion to testify. Today, when a witness is ordered to appear, he has a right
to counsel,' 7 right to a transcript,' 8 a right to cross examine,10 and the privilege
against self-incrimination. 20 But with the development of these rights, a correspond-
ing sanction has developed, i.e., a contempt citation for failing to answer an order
to appear.21
Compensating witnesses has also been recognized as a procedural requirement in
government administrative proceedings.22 The administrative agency appeared in
1887 as a quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial organization. 23 The requirement for or-
der and fairness in these proceedings has long been recognized. But again, the re-
quirement of a statute is essential before compensation can be authorized.24 The fed-
eral government now conducts hearings and investigations on such a scale that the
nature of such proceedings has taken on many of the trappings of their judicial coun-
terparts.
1028 U.S.C. § 1821 (1964); 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77 (1965).
Starmont v. Cummins, 120 Mich. 629, 79 N.W. 897 (1899).
"Vincennes Steel Corp. v. Miller, 94 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1938).
Is Parsons Band Cutter & Self-Feeder Co. v. Sciscoe, 129 Iowa 631, 106 N.W. 164 (1906).14Dep't of Highways v. McWilliams Dredging Co., 83 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. La. 1951), aff'd,
187 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1951); Modick v. Carvel Stores of New York, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 361
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
,B Western Creamery Co. v. Malia, 89 Utah 422, 57 P.2d 743 (1936); Kemart Corp. v. Print-
ing Arts Research Labs, 232 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1956).
1897 C.J.S. Witnesses § 37 (1966).
17 In the Matter of Neil, 209 F. Supp. 76 (S. D. W. Va. 1962).
Mott v. MacMahon, 214 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
19 Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1956).
SIn re Groban's Petition, 352 U.S. 330 (1957); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955);
ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
m Duffy v. Brody, 147 F. Supp. 897 (D. Mass. 1957).
2 NLRB v. Gunaca, supra note 5; Dickerson v. Mangham, 194 Ga. 446, 22 S.E. 2d 88 (1942).
0 Bar Ass'n of D.C., TRIAL TECHNIQUES ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 102 (1958).
" NLRB v. Gunaca, supra note 5.
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Early studies in this area reflect the concern for maintaining fairness and due pro-
cess in the growing administrative proceedings. In 1941, the final report of the At-
torney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure reflected the philosophy
behind such concern:
Administrative agencies have been derived by Congress under the pressure
of events for the exercise of new powers in new fields. Yet Congress has rarely
undertaken to state the principles under which they shall operate. Views as to
their proper method of operation range from entire absence of restriction to and
beyond the requirement of full judicial procedure, as in jury trials at common
law. Not only has Congress given the Agencies themselves little direction, it has
given the public and reviewing courts almost no indication of its desire as to their
method of operation.
Of course, whatever the procedure or lack of procedure, most citizens aquiesce
in the judgment of the Government. Those of modest means or humble interests
rarely question a decision by a Federal official. Others feel that no matter what
the outcome, their business or their pocketbooks suffer by a contest. Anyone must
recognize the uncertainties of such a contest. For these reasons, it is the more nec-
essary to devise methods, and constantly improve them, by which the exercise of
the devices and far-reaching power of the national Government will be kept
more nearly within those channels of justice which everyone feels to be desirable.
At the same time, we must take care that we do not cripple the nation by elab-
orate routines, which stultify rather than aid the purpose of government.25
The Committee proposed that fair procedure should be composed of those devices
that would reduce hardships to the citizen, and concluded that these devices are es-
sential to any administrative proceeding.26 This philosophy was evidenced earlier by
Justice Brandeis' statement that "in the development of our liberty, insistence upon
procedural regularity has been a large factor." 27
Later, when Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, it hoped
to give wide latitude for judicial review over administrative proceedings.2 8 The pur-
pose of the act was to provide simple and standard procedures for all administrative
agencies 29 and to refer questions of law to the courts rather than to administrative
agencies.0 However, its scope as defined by subsequent court decisions, has been lim-
ited.31 The provision for judicial review at the request of "any person suffering a legal
wrong because of any administrative action" 32 has not come to fruition.
Application of these principles to the Internal Revenue Service has also been lim-
2S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1941).
Id. at 216.
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921).
s Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 241-42 (1946).
80 S. REp. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1955); H. R. Rr. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
44 (1946).
31 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229
(1953); United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
3 Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (a) (1964).
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ited. The purpose of the IRS is to finance the operation of Government, redistribute
income, and foster the growth of industries by granting certain incentives. Thus, be-
cause of a concern for the effective operation of this agency, Congress insulated IRS
from judicial proceedings thus limiting review of administrative process33
Despite the governmental purpose doctrine, the courts have generally allowed
witness compensation in administrative proceedings. The procedural rights given to
witnesses in administrative proceedings prevent minor government officials from
summoning witnesses and compelling their appearance without compensating them,
thereby creating hardships.3 4 Witnesses at tax examinations have the right to coun-
sel.3 5 A lack of case law exists on the subject of travel costs for witnesses, but writers
on the subject indicate that fair dealing would compel their payment.3 6
While the witness in an administrative hearing is usually allowed all the rights giv-
en to a witness in law, 37 a distinction has been made for those witnesses subject to
administrative investigations. A hearing presupposes a formal proceeding upon no-
tice, adversaries and issues on which evidence may be adduced.38 In this situation,
section 95 (a) has guaranteed the same fees that are paid to witnesses in court. How-
ever, the investigation is conducted to determine whether facts justify a hearing. The
proceedings involve no determinations or decisions between parties, for there are no
parties.3 9 Against this background, the Comptroller General of the United States has
ruled that, despite the recent 5th circuit decisions, 4 0 witnesses called pursuant to sec-
tion 7602 are not entitled to witness fees.4 1
In holding section 95 (a) inapplicable to IRS witnesses the Comptroller General
relied on three points: absence of sufficient judicial precedent, absence of conclusive
legislative history to establish the intent of Congress, and the equities surrounding
appearances of witnesses called to court does not coincide with the obligations of
taxpayers summoned to an examination.
The Comptroller General's reliance on lack of judicial precedent was a reference
to Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States.42 However, while Justice Cardozo's opin-
ion did hold that precedent should be given great weight, he held that it was not con-
clusive, and, by itself, might be inadequate.43 To this the Comptroller General added
that there was no legislative history to indicate the Congressional intent. But this ar-
gument does not conclusively establish that Congress did not intend to apply the
interpretation given by the 5th circuit. In his analysis, the Comptroller General does
point out that the enactment of the revenue code only provided for witness fees in
83 Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201-02 (1964), excepts tax matters.
14 United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 195 (1956).
31 In the Matter of Neil, supra note 17.
1 Newman, Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural Rights of the Subpoenaed Witness,
60 MICH. L. REV. 169 (1962).
HFalsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953).
Albert v. Public Service Commission, 209 Md. 27, 120 A.2d 346 (1956).
In re Securities and Exchange Commission, 84 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1936).
10 United States v. Lemlich, supra note 1; United States v. Wolff, supra note 1.
11 DEcs. COMP. GEN., B-158810, April 26, 1966.
288 U.S. 294 (1933).
43Id. at 303.
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conjunction with disputes before the tax court.44 By implication, he concludes, the
failure of Congress to act would indicate that section 7602 proceedings do not con-
stitute hearings within the scope of section 95 (a).
The IRS requested an opinion after Lemlich and Wolff indicated the necessity to
pay witness fees. The Assistant Commissioner's letter to the Comptroller General ad-
dressed itself to the distinction between administrative hearings and investigations. 45
He contended that the doctrine underlying investigations should apply to examina-
tions conducted under section 7602. The Comptroller General did not decide this
point, but conceded that the type of examination under section 7602 may have some
elements of a hearing.
The Comptroller General is appointed by law to be the "watchdog for Congress"
over federal expenditures. 46 In pursuing this mandate he is responsible to Congress
for the investigation of the uses of appropriated funds, that the uses were legitimate,
and that they were within the intent of Congress.
Over the years the Comptroller General has cut out a unique jurisdiction in exer-
cising his function. His rulings on federal expenditures have been held to be sole and
exclusive.47 Collateral to these rulings on accountability, he has authority under the
Dockery Act 48 to pass on questions of law, although the Attorney General is the re-
sponsible official within the executive branch to rule on questions of law.49 Because
of vague jurisdictional demarcations, conflict between the two officials has produced
opposite rulings.50 At the present time the Comptroller General is predominant and
does not consider himself bound by decisions of the Attorney General or any forum
other than the Supreme Court.51
The Comptroller General reacted to the IRS request in his traditional role as
guardian of the federal purse. However, there are serious questions that arise when
this position is extended to statutory interpretation,52 a question of law, that effective-
ly overrules the decisions of federal courts. The Comptroller General's concern over
ill-spent public funds has overriden any jurisprudential approach fostered by the
courts to provide a better administration of justice. The position of the witness, in-
convenienced by travel at his own expense, compelled by minor government officials
to attend secret proceedings, appears inimical to our present trends of justice as rec-
ognized in the federal courts and generally accepted in administrative hearings.53
" INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 7457.
'0 Letter from Ass't Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service to Comptroller General, March
28, 1966.
"Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 20 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
'1 McCabe v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 291 (1936); Belcher v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 137
(1941).
0 Dockery Act, 1894, ch. 174, 28 Stat. 205 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 22, 25, 31, 41,
42, 43, 44 U.S.C.)
40 Graybar Electric Co. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 232 (1940).
50 The Attorney General has also ruled on the subject in the instant case with different
results: 17 Ors. Arr'Y. GEN. 247 (1881), 21 Ops. A-r'Y. GEN. 263 (1895).
1127 DEcs. COMp. GEN. 655 (1948); 31 DEcs. COMP. GEN. 73 (1951); 31 DECS. COMP. GEN.
613 (1952); 33 DECs. COMP. GEN. 66 (1953).
5 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951); Climatic Rainwear Co. v. United States,
115 Ct. Cl. 520, 88 F. Supp. 415 (1950).
1 United States v. Minker, supra note 34.
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By this ruling the IRS was directed to amend their regulations to disallow the pay-
ment of fees, with the result that the Comptroller General's opinion will again pre-
vail over a court decision. It is doubtful that this position will be changed since the
courts are hesitant to interfere with administrative decisions. 54 The trend in this area
has been to allow even constitutional principles to give way to allow administrative
agencies to gather the necessary information to promote the governmental purpose. 55
The Administrative Procedure Act did not increase the scope of judicial review, but,
in effect, only followed the policy of the courts by allowing limited review.56 The only
possibility for the institution of witness fees for examinations held pursuant to sec-
tion 7602 is specific action by Congress or the Supreme Court.
"United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 31; Heikkila v. Barber, supra note 31;
United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., supra note 31.
514 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 30.01 (1958).
51 United States v. Minker, supra note 34.
Federal Procedure-Discovery-Plaintiff Allowed to Determine Defendant's
Liability Insurance Coverage-Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C.
1966).
WILLIE V. CooK BROUGHT surr1 in the District Court for the District of Columbia to
recover damages for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. During the taking
of depositions, the defendant Elizabeth M. Welty, administratrix of the estate of the
owner and driver of the automobile involved in the accident, was asked to disclose
the extent of liability insurance carried by the decedent. When the defendant refused
to answer the question on the grounds that it was irrelevant to the issues in the case,
plaintiff moved to compel response. Judge Alexander Holtzoff granted the motion
finding that to allow discovery of liability insurance coverage is "conducive to fair
negotiations and to just settlements" and is in line with the objectives of modern re-
formed procedure.2
Although the above case is one of first impression in the District of Columbia, the
question of the plaintiff's right to discover the extent of the defendant's insurance
coverage is not new. 3 To date there are no less than thirty cases on point.4 Also, there
are problems of interpreting Sec. 26 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5 or
Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966).
Id. at 877.
The first case on point was Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
'For an exhaustive listing of cases on point see 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcriCE 26.16 [3]
(2d ed. 1963).
5 FED. R. Cxv. P. 26 (b), 28 U.S.C.A.
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some similar state statute. California, in allowing discovery, felt compelled to look
beyond its rules of procedure. 6 The state Supreme Court declared that the Insurance
Code7 created a contractual relationship between the insurer and third parties who
might be negligently injured by the insured and therefore ". . . the very pendency of
an action by the injured person brought in good faith against the named insured per-
son gives the former a discoverable interest in the policy."8
The position taken in California was bolstered by an Illinois decision9 in which
the state Supreme Court found that the state's Insurance Code10 created an interest
in every member of the public who is negligently injured and, thus, through discov-
ery of insurance coverage the plaintiff is apprised of rights of which he may other-
wise have been unaware.
Nevada, following the same approach, reached an opposite result." The state Su-
preme Court decided that the Nevada Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act' 2 did
not create a contractual relationship between the insurer and the third party, thus,
there could be no discoverable interest. Although Montana, like Nevada, did not
have an insurance code which could be interpreted as creating a contractual rela-
tionship between the insurer and third parties, the federal district court was able to
find that such a relationship did in fact exist because many of the insurance contracts
contained the direct-action-after-judgment provisions which were mandatory under
the California and Illinois statutes. 13
Not all courts favoring discovery of insurance coverage appeal to other statutes to
justify their decisions. Several courts have simply found, with little explanation, that
such information is relevant to the subject matter.14 One case has reasoned that "...
if the insurance question is relevant to the subject matter after the plaintiff prevails,
why is it not relevant while the action pends?". 15 Many courts set forth as a determi-
native factor the argument that allowing discovery would aid in the settlement of
many cases before trial.16 Such settlements, it has also been argued, would accom-
plish the basic purpose of the rules of procedure, namely, to reach a "just inexpen-
sive determination"' 7 and, therefore, information which would increase the chance
for a settlement is relevant.' 8 The basic premise of this argument is questioned by
several courts which maintain that knowledge of insurance coverage by plaintiff
6 Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 835 (1951).
7 CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.
8 Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra note 6, at 754, 235 P.2d at 835.
9 State ex tel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill.2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
'
0 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 1000 '(1955).
"State ex rel. Allen v. Second Judicial District Court, 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999 (1952).
"Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act of 1949, NEv. REv. STAT. tit. 43, § 485.011 (1961).
1Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.D.R. 272 (D. Mont. 1961).
1" Novak v. Goodwill Grange No. 127, 28 F.R.D. 394 (D. Conn. 1961); Furumizo v. United
States, 33 F.R.D. 18 (D. Hawaii 1963); Hurley v. Schmid, 37 F.R.D. 1 (D. Ore. 1965).
15 Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954) at 942.
10 State ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, supra note 9; Brackett v. Woodall Food Product, 12 F.R.D. 4
(E.D. Tenn. 1951).
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
"Hill v. Greer, 30 F.R.D. 64 (D.N.J. 1961).
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might impair settlement chances 19 when the insurance coverage was greater than the
injury suffered.
The thrust of most arguments against discovery is that insurance coverage is not
relevant to the subject matter in the action. 20 Such information is claimed to be out-
side the scope of questioning because it is not "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence."'21 Arguments based on insurance codes and motor
vehicle safety-responsibility acts are dismissed as not persuasive because proof of the
ability to satisfy a judgment is not related to the issue of liability for negligence.22
Another argument advanced against discovery is that allowing plaintiff to deter-
mine defendant's insurance assets will lead to allowing discovery of defendant's gen-
eral assets and, therefore, is the first step in a serious breach of privacy.28 This argu-
ment has been answered by advocates of discovery who distinguish liability insur-
ance from other assets on the ground that the former, unlike the latter, exists solely
to satisfy the insured's liability.24
The present case, although allowing the discovery of insurance coverage, admits
that the arguments against discovery are logically invulnerable, but dismisses them
with a charge of narrowness and a quote from Holmes.25
The court placed its emphasis on the congested dockets of the courts, arguing that
discovery would aid in increasing the number of settlements. The Court quoted the
following from State ex rel. Terry v. Fisher in support of the relevancy of insurance
coverage in the action:
[A]s far as the investigation and conduct of the defense is concerned, it would
seem to be relevant, if not indispensable that plaintiff's attorney have knowledge
of the existence of insurance in order to prepare for the case he has to meet and
be apprised of his real adversary. 26
It is very doubtful that Cook v. Welty will ever be considered a highly persuasive
case. It adds nothing new to this much overworked area, and it is only a decision on
a pre-trial motion. Nevertheless, it is a case of first impression in the District of Col-
umbia, and it provides an example of the utter confusion surrounding the scope of
discovery under 26 (b) of the Federal Rules. At the present time, a district court need
only choose one of the conflicting arguments set out in Judge Holtzoff's opinion and
proceed to interpret 26 (b) with a free hand.
There are no court of appeals decisions on the point.27 There are even two dis-
19 Rosenberger v. Vallejo, 30 F.R.D. 352 (W.D.Pa. 1962).
1 McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Langlois v. Allen, 30 F.R.D. 67 (D.
Conn. 1962); McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
MOORE, supra note 4.
Langlois v. Allen, supra note 20.
Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958).
'Johanek v. Aberle, supra note 13.
25HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 41 (1881), "The life of the law has not been logic, but
experience," quoted in Cook v. Welty, supra note 1, at 877.
* State ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, supra note 9, at 239; 145 N.E.2d at 593.
27Cook v. Welty, supra note 1.
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tricts which have cases going in both directions.28 Until there is a court of appeals de-
cision or until § 26 (b) is made more explicit, the only definite statement that can be
made concerning the discovery of insurance coverage by a plaintiff is the following:
There is a clear divergence of opinion on this question ... there is no clear ma-
jority on either side of the question nor any unequivocal discernible trend.29
2 There are decisions both ways in Tennessee, Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (D. Tenn.
1962) discovery refused, Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, supra note 16, discovery allowed;
and Connecticut, Langlois v. Allen, supra note 20, discovery refused, and Novak v. Goodwill
Grange No. 127, supra note 14, discovery allowed.
2 McDaniel v. Mayle, 30 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
